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“Light But Not White”: A Race/Plus Model of
Latina/o Subordination
Alfredo Mirandé*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper grew out of the LatCrit Conference held in Chicago, Illinois,
on October 3rd through 5th in 2013, the theme of which was “Resistance
Rising: Theorizing and Building Cross-Sector Movements.” The subject of
the paper, however, extends well beyond the conference theme and falls
within the first of five standing guideposts for LatCrit scholarship, which
focuses on “the multiple dimensionality of Latina/o identity and its
relationship to current legal, political, and cultural regimes or practices.”1
“Light but Not White” is based on data derived from a larger study of
transnational migration between Jalostotitlán (“Jalos”) in Jalisco, México,
and Turlock, California, that seeks to integrate the study of race and
immigration. While a detailed discussion of the findings of the larger study
is beyond the scope of this paper, my goal here is to offer a critique of the
prevailing Black/White racial binary in law and sociology and propose a
new race/plus theoretical paradigm for understanding not only the
experiences of Jalos migrants, but also Latina/o2 identity, Equal Protection
*

Alfredo Mirandé is a professor of Sociology and Ethnic Studies at the University of
California, Riverside. Funding for this research was made possible by a research grant
from UC Mexus and by the Academic Senate of the University of California, Riverside.
1
LatCrit 2013 Call for Papers, LATCRIT http://www.latcrit.org/content/conferences/
latcrit-biennial-conferences/latcrit-2013/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
2
I will be using the terms, Mexican, Latina/o, and Chicana/o throughout the paper.
Mexican obviously refers to persons of Mexican descent and the focus of the larger study
was on Mexican migration to the United States. Latina/o is a more inclusive term used to
refer to Mexicanos and other persons from Latino América. While my focus is on
Mexican migration, the findings have important implications for other Spanish-speaking
communities in the United States. Finally, the word Chicana/o is a more political term
that is used to refer to people of Mexican descent who are residing in the United States on
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doctrine, and the anti-subordination principle. This new race/plus paradigm
proposes that, while Jalos migrants and other Latinas/os are subjected to
race-based discrimination and subordination, they also experience
discrimination based on language, culture, and real or putative alienage
status.
Consistent with the underlying principles of Latino Critical Race
(“LatCrit”) scholarship and Critical Race Theory (“CRT”), I seek to put the
study of race at the center of both legal analysis and sociological theory
while at the same time challenging the prevailing Black/White racial binary.
Although there has been a strong interest in the study of race in sociology,
much of the past sociological research has adopted a Black/White racial
binary model that ignores the experiences of Latinos, Asians, and other
groups that do not fit the binary model.3 Within law, on the other hand,
because of the plenary power of Congress over immigration, the study of
race and Equal Protection and the study of alienage have been doctrinally
bifurcated. As a result, both within sociology and law, there is a dire need to
integrate the study of race and the study of immigration/alienage, and to
adopt multidisciplinary perspectives that eschew simplistic binary views
and recognize the complexity of race and ethnicity in contemporary society.
Finally, this study of transnational migration between Jalos and Turlock
examines an important and relatively neglected question regarding the role
that race, or skin color and complexion, may play in explaining the relative
success of some Latino immigrants in the United States. In addition to their
social, human, and cultural capital, which includes their strong work ethic,

a relatively permanent basis and who have been denied basic cultural and citizenship
rights.
3
See, e.g., NATALIA MOLINA, HOW RACE IS MADE IN AMERICA: IMMIGRATION,
CITIZENSHIP, AND THE HISTORICAL POWER OF RACIAL SCRIPTS (2013); Robert S. Chang
& Neil Gotanda, The Race Question in LatCrit Theory and Asian American
Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 1012, 1014–15 (2007); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary
Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1213, 1215 (1997).
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people from Jalos and the Los Altos de Jalisco region tend to be relatively
fair and light complexioned. It is, therefore, important to examine the
possible advantages of being light-skinned as a form of social capital that
might facilitate their success.
The paper begins with a discussion of the racial binary and the
antidiscrimination principle, and then presents a brief overview of the
sample, data, and qualitative methods used in the underlying study. The
paper then turns to an examination of some of the factors that might help to
promote the relative labor market success of Jalos migrants and their strong
identification with their community of origin. I then turn to a discussion of
prevailing conceptions of race in law and sociology, the social construction
of Whiteness, and White privilege in the United States. I conclude by
introducing the race/plus model and noting that, while people from Jalos are
relatively light in complexion, they are not accepted as White and are
subjected not only to racial discrimination but to discrimination based on
language, culture, and real or perceived immigration status. The final
section applies the race/plus model to relevant case law in various areas,
including jury exclusion, language-based employment discrimination,
educational segregation, and racial profiling and Fourth Amendment search
and seizure border stops.

II. THE RACIAL BINARY AND THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection doctrine, and
antidiscrimination principles in American jurisprudence are derived largely
from the history of slavery and the attempt to eliminate the vestiges of
slavery and racial animus that had been directed against African Americans
during reconstruction.4 In what was to become a classic statement on Civil
Rights and the Equal Protection doctrine, Paul Brest describes the
4
See generally Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).

VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 3 • 2014

949

950 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

antidiscrimination principle as a “general principle disfavoring
classifications and other decisions and practices that depend on race (or
ethnic origin) of the parties affected.” 5 The historical and doctrinal
development of the “antidiscrimination principle” can be traced to the postCivil War Amendments to the Constitution.6 A century after the Civil War,
our nation was committed to the antidiscrimination principle. Of the
Reconstruction Amendments, only the Fifteenth explicitly embodied this
commitment. In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, however, Congress read the
antidiscrimination principle into the Thirteenth Amendment, and the
Supreme Court has constructed the amorphous language of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that racial
classifications are “constitutionally suspect” and subject to “the most rigid
scrutiny.”7
Brest agues, moreover, that doctrinal acceptance of the antidiscrimination
principle is difficult, given that “the text and history of the [Equal
Protection C]lause are vague and ambiguous and cannot, in any event,
infuse the antidiscrimination principle with the moral force or justify its
extension to novel circumstances or new beneficiaries.”8 He believes we
should adopt the principle disfavoring racial or ethnic classifications,
irrespective of the actual intent of the framers, because it is derived from
widely accepted notions of equality, which are generally accepted in the
society. 9 Although Brest uses the word “race” as shorthand for race and
ethnic origin, he notes that the antidiscrimination principle can be extended
to include a variety of other traits, such as alienage, illegitimacy, and sex.10
In this paper, I seek to follow Brest’s lead by extending the
antidiscrimination principle and Equal Protection doctrine to “novel
5
6
7
8
9
10

Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
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circumstances and new beneficiaries” by applying the principle to the
Latina/o experience in contemporary society with not only racial
discrimination, but also discrimination based on language, culture, and real
or putative alienage and immigration status.

III. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
The underlying research for this article began nearly a decade ago, after I
obtained a UC Mexus–CONACYT grant to study transnational migration to
the United States and its impact on gender, community, and identity.11 I
selected the city of Jalostotitlán (“Jalos”) as the final research site in
Mexico because it is in a region, Los Altos de Jalisco, which has a long
history of migration to the United States, dating to the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Most men and a plurality of women from Jalos migrate
to the United States at some point in their lives—some as early as ages 14
or 15.
Turlock, California was selected as the point of destination for Jalos
migrants and the counterpart research site on the US side of the border.
Migrants from Jalos are concentrated in several communities in California,
including Anaheim, Oakland, Sacramento, and Los Angeles. Turlock
seemed like an ideal comparison site because there is a great deal of
migration from Jalos there and because it is an agricultural community
roughly the same size as Jalos. Finally, more than a decade ago Turlock
sought to extend the Jalos custom of honoring the town’s Patron Saint, La
Virgen de la Asunción (Virgin of the Assumption), on August 15th by
establishing their own celebration for the Virgen.

11

A special thanks to UC Mexus (the University of California Institute for Mexico and
the United States) and Mexico’s CONACYT (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y
Tecnologia) for providing the funding that made this study possible. In the initial phases
of the research in Jalostotitlán, Mexico, I benefited greatly from a productive
collaboration with Dr. Nelson Minello, a sociologist who was my Mexican counterpart on
the UC Mexus and the CONACYT grants.

VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 3 • 2014

951

952 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

A Mexican colleague provided the name and contact information of an
anthropologist, Professor Xavier Glass, 12 who was not only thoroughly
acquainted with the history, political-economy, and culture of the area, but
also well respected, connected to many people in the community, and
willing and eager to talk and to support the research. Initial contacts in Jalos
were made through “social notables,” such as Dr. Glass, the assistant mayor
of Jalostotitlán, and Elvira, a young woman who worked at a local
electronics and souvenir shop in the center of town.
An important source for establishing networks and making contacts with
people in Turlock were social notables identified by Elvira, as well as the
Catholic Parish of El Sagrado Corazón (Sacred Heart). I was able to meet
and interview not only several of the parish priests, but also parishioners,
including Lola Olmedo, the woman largely responsible for establishing the
Turlock celebration for the Virgen.13
The findings of the larger study were based on a wide range of qualitative
research methods, including participant observation, ethnographic field
research, archival research, and in-depth personal interviews conducted on
both sides of the border in Jalos and Turlock. Interviewees included
ordinary citizens, as well as priests, school principals, psychologists, and
social service providers. Finally, focus group interviews were carried out
with youth in the respective communities, one in Turlock and three in Jalos.
The Turlock focus group consisted of 15 to 17 year-old youth. One of the
Jalos focus groups involved students at CONALEP, a technical high school
that prepares its students for work in trades, such as auto mechanics,
electrical maintenance, and welding. The second consisted of students at the
12

I have opted to use pseudonyms to protect the privacy and to maintain the
confidentiality of my respondents, most of whom came to the United States “sin
papeles” (without papers).
13
Interview with Xavier Glass, professor, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Aug. 12, 2006.
Interview with Father Patricio, priest, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Feb. 18, 2007.
Interview with Father Rogelio, priest, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Feb. 18, 2007.
Interview with Father Marcos, priest, Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, Mex., Feb. 20, 2007.
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Prepa, or college preparatory school in Jalos, who came from more middle
and upper class families. A final focus group was conducted with a class of
kindergarten children in Jalos. 14 The total sample for the study included
approximately 40 persons in Jalos and 45 in Turlock.
The interviews were open-ended and consisted of several broad
questions, including where the person was born and raised, his or her
background, and demographic information such as parents’ level of
education and occupation, number of siblings, and birth order in the family.
There were also questions about how his or her parents got along and who
exercised the most control in the family. Other topics included noviazago
(courtship) and other dating rituals, decision-making in the family, concepts
of masculinity, gender roles, attitudes toward child-rearing, perceptions of
the major problems facing the community and/or youth, and relations
between ausentes (migrants) and Jalos residents.
When interviewing the Turlock sample, a great deal of attention was
devoted to the migration process, social networks, and how life changes in
the United States for migrants from Jalos and their families. The Turlock
youth focus group was conducted bilingually. All of the other interviews
and focus groups were conducted exclusively in Spanish and then
translated. I also translated passages from Spanish language publications as
needed.

14

The group was made up of approximately eight children. After the session ended, the
teacher led the children into a room that had different work or learning cubicles and
activities for various vocations, such as grocery, carpentry, science, and beauty salon.
Caesar, a boy that dominated the focus group, went to the grocery store and immediately
took charge of the cash register and play money, whereas other children took shopping
carts and started shopping for food. Not surprisingly, virtually all of the girls rushed to
the beauty salon center and started playing with wigs, putting on make-up, and using toy
hair dryers. This suggests that even at an early age, children’s occupational choices and
predispositions are clearly structured along traditional gender lines. It also reinforces the
common belief that Jalos girls are “girlie” and feminine. Sadly, none of the children were
drawn into the science center with play microscopes and other scientific paraphernalia.
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Although most Jalos migrants had little or no education and limited
proficiency in English, one of the major findings of the study is that many,
particularly members of the older or pioneering generation, had a very
strong work ethic and were remarkably successful in the United States.
Although not the focus of this paper, one of the goals of the larger study
was to isolate factors, such as social or cultural capital, that might help to
explain or account for this relative success.

IV. FACTORS PROMOTING JALOS MIGRANTS LABOR MARKET
SUCCESS: AN OVERVIEW
One of the most salient factors found to promote the labor market
success of people from Jalos in the United States, as well as their strong
Jalos identity, was their affiliation with religion and the Catholic Church,
which constitutes social, cultural, and human capital for residents. Two
religious-based Jalos fiestas, the celebration for La Virgen de la Asunción in
August and Carnaval on the eve of Lent in late February or early March,
contain important ceremonies and rituals that unite people in the community
and reinforce a collective consciousness and pride in “being from Jalos.” In
other words, the fiestas reinforce identification with the community and the
sense of a collective origin, awareness, and pride.15 Significantly, one of
the days in the Jalos fiestas and a special mass are devoted to los ausentes.
Ausentes, as opposed to presentes, are people who have left the community
and whose children and descendants are now in the United States. The
fiestas also provide an important opportunity for ausentes to display their
visible symbols of material success such as shiny new pick-up trucks, sports
utility vehicles (SUVs), electronic devices, and other manifestations of their
purchasing and consumption patterns.
These rituals also reinforce the success stories of the numerous migrants
who have traveled to the United States, and they serve as network-creating
15

Alfredo Mirandé, Toribio Romo, el Padre Pollero, 38 AZTLÁN: J. OF CHICANO STUD.
95, 95–96 (2013).
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and network-maintaining mechanisms for people who wish to migrate to the
United States. In addition, even after people migrate to a foreign country
and are exposed to a new culture and language, the Catholic Church
continues to serve as a constant source of stability and support for new
arrivals.
Identification with the Church is greatly facilitated by the presence of
Latino priests and by Spanish-language masses and catechism classes,
together with the fact that the majority of the parishioners in the Sacred
Heart Parish in Turlock are Spanish speakers and most are from Jalos.
Additionally, with the inauguration of the celebration for the Virgen de La
Asunción in Turlock, the community members have come full circle in
bringing a little bit of Jalos to Turlock and transforming La Virgen into a
transnational icon in Mexico and the United States, so that Jalos identity can
be maintained and reinforced in both countries, or in a unique third space.16
Even more pronounced is the emergence of El Padre Toribio 17 as a
transnational icon who performs many miracles for migrants and
undocumented workers, without borders or limits.
Family, friendship, church social networks, and social capital are all
important factors in promoting identification with Jalos and the labor
market success of the Jalos community. One of the unique features of the
study is that it examined the creation and maintenance of a transnational
identity and community among persons who self-identify as being “from
Jalos,” regardless of their birthplace, citizenship, or residence.18 I contend
16
See Roger Rouse, Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism, in
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 247–259
(David G. Gutiérrez ed., 1996).
17
Toribo Romo, a young Mexican priest and Saint born outside of Jalos, was killed by
the Mexican government during the Cristero War and became one of the Cristero Martyrs
in the 1920s. In recent years, he has emerged in Mexican border folklore as a mysterious
stranger who miraculously appears at or near the border and helps people in distress,
sometimes not only giving them food and water but even helping them across the border
into the United States. Mirandé, supra note 15, at 95.
18
Id. at 96.
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Jalos is a community that originated in the town of Jalostotitlán, Jalisco, but
has become an international community without borders. 19 It is a
community, “unified by religion, language, customs, rituals, tastes, and the
like” and “integrated at the micro-level by kinship systems and primordial
loyalties.”20
The findings of the larger study are consistent with other research
pointing to the importance of social networks and social capital in
explaining a continuous pattern of migration. James Coleman, for example,
maintains that “social capital is created when the relations among persons
change in ways that facilitate action.”21 Although social ties of friendship
and kinship in and of themselves provide few advantages to people seeking
to migrate, once a person from one’s social network has migrated, these ties
become a resource that can be drawn upon to gain access to foreign
employment and all that is associated with such employment. 22 Most
migrants from Jalos to Turlock have family or friends in the area who
greatly facilitate not only finding employment, housing, places to shop for
food, and schools, but also making the transition in general to a new country
and culture.23 Social networks with family and friends reinforce not only a
strong identification with Jalos but also a worldview that includes a belief in
the American Dream. However, rather than focusing on individual success,
the American Dream is viewed as a collective enterprise.

19

Other studies have pointed to the existence of transnational communities without
borders. See, e.g., MANUEL BARAJAS, THE XARIPU COMMUNITY ACROSS BORDERS:
LABOR MIGRATION, COMMUNITY, AND FAMILY (2009); ROBERT COURTNEY SMITH,
MEXICAN NEW YORK: TRANSNATIONAL LIVES OF NEW IMMIGRANTS (2006).
20
See generally RUBEN GOWRICH, CARIBBEAN TRANSNATIONALISM: MIGRATION,
PLURALIZATION, AND SOCIAL COHESION (2006).
21
JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 304 (1990).
22
Marcela Cerrutti & Douglas S. Massey, Trends in Mexican Migration to the United
States, 1965 to 1995, in CROSSING THE BORDER: RESEARCH FROM THE MEXICAN
MIGRATION 19 (Jorge Durand & Douglas S. Massey eds., 2004).
23
Mirandé, supra note 15, at 96.

LATCRIT 2013: RESISTANCE RISING

"Light But Not White": A Race/Plus Model of Latina/o Subordination

The first generatin of Jalos migrants to Turlock and other communities in
the United States set the stage for and facilitated the migration of
subsequent migrants. 24 Most people who migrate to Turlock already had
family and/or friends in the community, and these social networks greatly
facilitated their integration into the new culture and language, providing
help and support in finding housing, schools, grocery shopping, and
employment.
According to Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, once certain
members of a community migrate, migration becomes self-sustaining, as
migrants are successful in transmitting new information about economic
opportunities and the migration process that facilitates the migration of
others.25 In a study of 822 adult, male Mexican immigrants who arrived at
two Texas ports of entry on the border, Portes and Robert Bach found that
over 90 percent of the respondents had obtained legal residence through
family and employee connections.26 Douglas S. Massey and his associates
also found that social networks accounted for the migration patterns of 19
Mexican communities where migration was classified as normative.27 They
noted that “the act of migration not only induces changes within individual
migrants that make further movement more likely, it also initiates changes
in social structures that spread migration through the community.” 28
Pedro López, one of the Turlock social notables I interviewed,
commented on the importance of social networks. 29 He said that people
from Jalos got together at the Church of the Sacred Heart in Turlock and
24

SMITH, supra note 19, at 21.
ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT
356–57 (3rd ed. 2006).
26
See generally ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND
MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1985).
27
See Douglas S. Massey, et al., Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of
Nineteen Mexican Communities, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1492 (1994).
28
Id. at 1500.
29
In person interview with Pedro López, a community member in Turlock, Turlock, Cal.
(June 14, 2007).
25

VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 3 • 2014

957

958 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

that the Church was “flooded” with people from Jalos.30 Pedro added that
people like his father and other persons from Jalos who first settled in
Turlock “gave a lot of support to many of their fellow countrymen, people
from the town [of Jalos], they established family bases here, and this is how
a large community is established.”31
Other factors facilitating the economic success of Jalos migrants to
Turlock are the labor skills and social and human capital that they bring
with them. As noted, Jalos and Turlock are similar in the sense that they are
both small, but rapidly growing, relatively isolated, rural communities
dominated by agriculture and dairy farming.32 Many Jalos residents bring
marketable skills and knowledge with them, which helps them find
employment and succeed. Juan Pérez, for example, grew up on a ranch near
Jalos and has always worked in agriculture. Although dairy farming is much
more mechanized in the United States, Juan got his job as a fiador (feeder)
on a local dairy farm outside of Turlock because of the skills and experience
that he had working in dairies.33 Rosa Fuentes’s husband is a fiador at the
same farm, but he worked as a bricklayer and in construction in Mexico. He
got his job at the dairy through friends from Jalos who showed him how to
do the work a little bit at a time and ultimately recommended him for the
job.34
In order to contextualize the major findings of the larger study, in the
next section I will provide a brief overview of the existing literature on
immigration and race. As previously noted, most of the existing literature
on race has emanated from a Black/White binary model. Studies of
immigration, on the other hand, have historically tended to either ignore or

30

Id.
Id.
32
Mirandé, supra note 15, at 96.
33
In person interview with Juan Pérez a fiador who worked at a dairy outside Turlock,
Turlock, Cal. (June 12, 2007).
34
In person Interview with Rosa Fuentes, Turlock, Cal. (June 14, 2007).
31
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neglect race. In this article, I seek to address this void by integrating the
study of immigration and race.

V. “BRINGING RACE BACK IN”: INTEGRATING THEORIES OF
IMMIGRATION AND RACE
Immigration and alienage has been of considerable interest within not
only law, but also anthropology, economics, political science, and
sociology. In law, the focus has been largely on case law and constitutional
issues surrounding alienage, as well as race and equal protection. Until
recently, there has been little interest in studying how race impacts
immigration and citizenship status. Similarly, there has been a void in the
social sciences between scholars who study race and those who study
immigration.
Although there is strong interest in the study of race in sociology, much
of the past sociological research adopted a Black/White racial binary model
that ignored or neglected the experiences of Latinos, Asians, and other
groups that do not fit the binary model.35 The study of alienage and the
plenary power of Congress over immigration, on the one hand, and the
study of race and Equal Protection doctrine, on the other, have been
doctrinally bifurcated.36 As a result, both within sociology and within law,
there is a dire need to integrate the study of race and the study of
immigration/alienage, and to adopt multidisciplinary perspectives that
eschew simplistic binary views and recognize the complexity of race and
ethnicity in contemporary society.
Perhaps the most significant and challenging development in the study of
race and ethnicity over the past 30 years has been the emergence of many
new theoretical paradigms and perspectives. In addition to postmodernism

35
36

See Perea, supra note 3.
Id.
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and cultural studies theory, new paradigms and perspectives include CRT
and LatCrit37 as well as cultural citizenship perspectives.38
CRT, for example, is a movement in law that emerged in the 1980s that
puts race at the center of legal analysis. It has been appropriated and applied
in education, sociology, and other social sciences. Francisco Valdés, Jerome
McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris, for example, have pointed out that
CRT challenges three basic beliefs about racial justice in the United
States. 39 The first and most persistent of these beliefs is that “race
blindness” will eventually eliminate racism.40 The second belief, identified
by Valdés, Culp, and Harris as being challenged by CRT, is that race is a
matter of individual prejudice rather than of systemic racism.41 The third
and final belief challenged by CRT, according to these authors, is that one
can fight racism while at the same time ignoring sexism, homophobia, and
other forms of oppression.42 In sum, CRT puts race at the center of legal
analysis, rejects the color-blind approach to legal scholarship, and sees
racism as systemic and endemic in contemporary society. It concludes that
one cannot hope to eliminate racism without simultaneously addressing
sexism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression.43
Within sociology, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, a Puerto Rican sociologist and
leading theorist in the field, has similarly been critical of prevailing,
simplistic sociological theories of race and racism that are based on
37

See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000). See supra notes
1–2.
38
See. e.g. LATINO CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: CLAIMING IDENTITY, SPACE, AND RIGHTS
(William V. Flores & Rina Benmayor eds., 1997).
39
Francisco Valdes et al., Battles Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical Race Theory at the
Turn of the Millenium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, 1 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
40
Id. at 1.
41
Id. at 1–2.
42
Id. at 2.
43
Id.
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psychological or social-psychological conceptualizations and sees racism as
endemic to society. 44 Contrary to such ideational approaches to race,
Bonilla-Silva advances a structural theory of race, which, like CRT, posits
that racism is inherent in social systems, rather than in the ideologies of the
members of these social systems. 45 He also dismisses Marxist and neoMarxist theories, such as Edna Bonacich’s split labor market theory, which
give primacy to the concept of class over race and interpret racism as an
ideological product of class dynamics.46 Although other theorists, such as
Mario Barrera, Robert Blauner, Michael Omi, and Howard Winant, have
proposed non-ideational conceptions of racism, Bonilla-Silva argues they
fall short of developing a structural explanation. 47 In short, prevailing
sociological theories of race tend to understand racism in terms of overt
individual behavior and exclude racism that emanates from within the
structure of the social system. 48 Bonilla-Silva concludes by noting that
extant theories in the social sciences tend to view racism in a circular
manner, so “racism is a belief that produces behavior, which is itself
racism.” 49 He believes social scientists should eschew social and social
psychological views of racism and proposes an alternative framework that
focuses on racialized social systems.50

VI. “LIGHT BUT NOT WHITE”: A NEW RACE/PLUS PARADIGM
This study of transnational migration between Jalos and Turlock seeks to
integrate race and alienage by addressing an important and neglected
question: What role does race, or skin color and complexion, play in the

44
See generally Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural
Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465 (1996).
45
Id. at 469.
46
Id. at 466.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 467.
49
Id. at 469.
50
Id.
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relative success of certain Jalos migrants? In addition to their social, human,
and cultural capital, which includes a very strong work ethic, people from
Los Altos de Jalisco tend to be relatively fair and light-complexioned. The
possible advantages of being light-skinned need to be acknowledged as a
potential form of social capital. 51 Although some respondents, including
Father Gustavo, one of the priests at the Turlock parish, 52 thought that,
although people from Jalos are on average not as light as most people from
the larger region of Los Altos de Jalisco, they are unquestionably fairer than
most Mexican migrants. However, I submit that it would be a mistake to
conclude that people from Jalos are “White,” with all of the advantages of
White privilege in the United States. Given the history of slavery and the
prevailing rule of hypodescent 53 in defining race in the United States, I
contend that it is one thing to be “light” and quite another to be accepted as
“White“ and accorded all of the rights and privileges associated with
“Whiteness.”54
In White by Law, Ian Haney López examines how Whiteness has been
defined and socially constructed by law. After looking at how the courts in
the United States have historically defined “Whiteness” López identifies
two dominant rationales or views of race: one that appeals to “common
knowledge” and one that is based on “scientific evidence.” 55 Although
courts initially used both views of race in their efforts to define Whiteness,
51

See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
Interview with Father Gustavo León (pseudonym), Pastor, Sacred Heart of Jesus
Parish, in Turlock, Cal. (June 12, 2007).
53
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda. A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257 (Kimberlé
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). The Rule of Hypodescent is also known as the “one-drop”
rule, so that if a person is any part Black he or she is defined as Black, whereas in Latino
América and the Caribbean, if a person is any part White, that person is likely to be
considered White. Id. at 258.
54
See, e.g., PAULA S. ROTHENBERG, WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON THE
OTHER SIDE OF RACISM (2002); JEAN HALLEY ET AL., SEEING WHITE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO WHITE PRIVILEGE AND RACE (2011).
55
IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 3 (2006).
52
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they became increasingly frustrated by scientific “manipulation” that
ignored racial differences by reportedly including in the category of
Caucasian “far more [people] than the unscientific mind suspects.”56 As a
result, the courts turned increasingly to so-called “common knowledge” as a
justification for racial classifications. The Supreme Court concluded that
“the words ‘free [W]hite persons’ are words of common speech, to be
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man.”57
Haney López concludes that the construction of a positive “White” identity
is ultimately not a scientific category but a hierarchical conception that
requires inferior minority identities.58 He argues that what is called for to
counter this conception of Whiteness is a deconstruction and rejection of
White identity and White privilege. 59 López contends that White people
must overcome “transparency” in order to fully appreciate the salience of
race to their identity.60 They should do so, however, with the intention of
consciously repudiating “Whiteness” as it is currently constituted.61
What is clear from Haney López’s discussion of the social and legal
construction of Whiteness is that, while light-skinned Mexicanas/os and
Latinas/os may be favored over dark-skinned ones, they are not considered
“White,” as that would entail their full acceptance into the in-group of
privileged Whites. “Whiteness,” after all, is ultimately not a racial
classification but a socially constructed one.62 Haney López suggests that
White identity is defined by the “othering” of non-Whites.63 Whites exist as
a category of people, subject to a double negative: They are those who are
not non-White.64
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 6.
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Using data from the New Immigrant Survey, a major collaborative and
long-running research study of new legal immigrants to the United States,
Reanne Frank, Ilana Redstone Akresh, and Bo Lu found that Latino
immigrants in the United States understand the privileges associated with a
“White” racial designation, but they also understand that the larger society
is not generally willing to grant them this designation.65 Additionally, they
found that darker-skinned Latino immigrants experienced increased colorbased racial discrimination relative to their annual income.66
While we should continue to work toward developing a structural theory
of racism, as suggested by CRT theorists and Bonilla-Silva, we must also
recognize that in addition to overt racism, Latinos/as in the United States,
including Jalos migrants, are subjected to a great deal of discrimination that
is ostensibly race neutral and at the same time legally sanctioned. Therefore,
it is important to develop what I term a “race/plus model,” which takes into
account not only intentional, institutional, and “common sense” racism,67
but also other forms of racism and discrimination that are not directly based
on race. In the next section, I present a new race/plus theoretical model of
discrimination, which recognizes that Latinos are subjected not only to
racial discrimination, but also to discrimination based on language, culture,
and real or perceived immigration status.

VII. APPLICATION OF THE RACE/PLUS MODEL
The focus on race and the racial binary in the antidiscrimination principle
and in Equal Protection jurisprudence is consistent with the prevailing
liberal view of equality. This view contends that “discrete and insular
minorities are those whose subordination is based on immutable

65

See generally Reanne Frank et al., Latino Immigrants and the U.S. Racial Order: How
and Where Do They Fit in?, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 378 (2010).
66
Id.
67
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 108
(2003).
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characteristics like race and skin color.”68 But it is more difficult to address
discrimination based on other traits like language, which are presumed to be
more mutable than race.69 I am not suggesting here that race and skin color
are not important bases of discrimination for these groups; they are
important. I am suggesting that, in addition to racial discrimination,
Latinas/os and other non-English-speaking, immigrant groups are subjected
to language and accent discrimination.70 Also, regardless of their citizenship
or immigration status, Mexicans are often perceived as “foreign” or alien,
and discrimination based on so-called “Mexican appearance” is not only
legally enforced, but also socially sanctioned.
Legal precedents in diverse areas such as jury selection, discrimination in
employment, segregation of Mexican students, and the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures demonstrate the
limitation of the extant binary model that prohibits racial discrimination, but
directly and indirectly condones discrimination based on language and real
or perceived immigration status.71
A. Discrimination in Jury Selection
One of the first cases where the US Supreme Court applied the
antidiscrimination principle was in the 1879 case of Strauder v. West
Virginia. 72 The Court held that a West Virginia statute barring colored
citizens from jury service and limiting jury service to White males, 21 years
of age and older was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
68
Alfredo Mirandé, “Revenge of the Nerds,” or Postmodern “Colored Folk”?: Critical
Race Theory and the Chronicles of Rodrigo, 4 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 153, 193 (2000).
69
Id.
70
See., e.g, Fragante v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989)
(upholding the dismissal of Manuel Fragante’s employment discrimination suit after he
applied for a clerk’s job and was not selected for the position despite scoring highest of
721 persons taking the civil service exam because of a perceived deficiency in relevant
oral communication skills caused by his “heavy Filipino accent”).
71
Space limitations preclude an extended discussion of the relevant case law.
72
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
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Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, unconstitutional. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,73 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment is not
confined to the protection of Black citizens and extended the constitutional
protection to permanent or temporary residents from China.
While Strauder prohibited racial discrimination in the jury composition,
it was not until nearly 75 years later, in Hernandez v. Texas,74 in the same
term as the historic Brown v. Board of Education desegregation decision,
that the Court extended the protection of Strauder to Mexicans. For the first
time, the Court challenged the racial binary in holding in Hernandez v.
Texas that people of Mexican origin constituted a distinct, legally
cognizable entity, separate and apart from Whites and Blacks and subject to
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 The Court ruled that it was a
denial of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to try a
defendant, like Pete Hernandez before a jury where all persons of his race or
ancestry have, because of that race or ethnicity, been excluded by the
State.76
Almost 40 years later however, the Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New
York77 would turn Hernandez v. Texas on its head by upholding the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude bilingual Spanish-speaking jurors from a
jury pool during voir dire examination. These exclusions were ostensibly
not based on race or language, but on the fact that the prosecution was not
convinced that Spanish-speaking jurors could abide by the official
translation provided by the court interpreters and thus offered a race-neutral
explanation for dismissing the jurors.78
Dionisio Hernandez petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the New
York State Supreme Court’s rejection of his claim that the prosecutor in his
73
74
75
76
77
78

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 482.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
Id. at 360.
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criminal trial exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos79 from the
jury because of their ethnicity, arguing that the prosecutor’s discriminatory
use of peremptory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause.80 In Batson
v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the use of race to exclude jurors
during voir dire was impermissible and a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 81 Using Batson’s three-step process for determining whether the
prosecution had used peremptory challenges in a way that violated the
Equal Protection Clause, 82 the Court had to determine whether the
prosecutor offered a race-neutral basis for challenging Latino potential
jurors and, if so, whether the state court’s decision to accept the
prosecutor’s explanation should be sustained.83
Hernandez argued that Spanish-language ability is inextricably linked to
ethnicity, and that, as a result, it is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause to exercise peremptory challenges to exclude Latino potential jurors
on the grounds that they speak Spanish. 84 He also pointed to the high
correlation between Spanish-language ability and ethnicity in New York.85
The Court concluded, however, “we need not address that argument here,
for the prosecutor did not rely on language ability without more but
explained that the specific responses and the demeanor of the two
individuals during voir dire caused him to doubt their ability to defer to the
official translation of Spanish-language testimony.”86

79

The Court noted that petitioner and respondent both used the term “Latino” in their
briefs to the Court but that the amicus brief employed “Hispanic” and that the parties
used that term to refer to the excluded jurors in the trial court, although no attempt was
made to distinguish the terms by the parties. In deference to the terminology preferred by
the parties, the Court opted to use Latino to refer to the excluded jurors. Id. at 355.
80
Id.
81
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 139 (1986).
82
Id. at 96–98.
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Hernandez, 500 U.S at 359.
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Id. at 360.
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In evaluating the race neutrality of the prosecution’s explanation for the
exclusion, the Court, relying on Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation87 and other relevant authority, held that “official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”88
The Court upheld Hernandez’s conviction, ruling that the state courts did
not commit clear error and were correct in accepting the prosecutor’s raceneutral explanation for his exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude
prospective Latino jurors.89 A critical implication of the Hernandez v. New
York holding is that language can now serve as proxy for race in excluding
Latinos from juries.
B. “We Don’t Allow No ‘Misican’ Talk”: Discrimination in Employment
While employment discrimination based on race or national origin is
prohibited under Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act90 and under
most equivalent state statutes, including the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA), 91 language is not a protected category under
current federal or state law. Because language discrimination is not
prohibited, employers can reprimand and/or fire people for speaking
Spanish on the job if they can simply articulate a bono fide business
necessity for imposing an English-only rule, a low threshold, such as
improving workplace safety and/or morale.92 Again, as in jury selection, in

87

Id. at 359–60
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977).
89
Hernandez, 500, U.S. at 372.
90
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991).
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California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–12996
(West 2011).
92
See, e.g., Alfredo Mirandé, “En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey” (“In the Land
of the Blind, the One-Eyed Person is King”): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. L.
REV. 75 (1996).
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an employment context, discrimination on the basis of language becomes a
proxy for racial discrimination.
One of the first cases to address English-only requirements in an
employment context was Saucedo v. Well Service, Inc.93 In this case, the
United States District Court of the Southern District of Texas held that a
Mexican employee had been subjected to employment discrimination when
he was fired after speaking two words of Spanish, while his supervisor was
retained despite the fact that he had engaged in fighting during the same
incident.94
At the time he was terminated, Saucedo was working as a floorman for
Brothers Well Service (“Brothers”), a small business operating “workover
rigs” near Houston. Though Saucedo’s employment history and work
record were satisfactory and Brothers did not have an English-only
employment rule, his immediate supervisor told him that as far as he was
concerned he could speak any language he wanted to but that the supervisor
on the rig, Doc Holliday, “didn’t allow any ‘Mesican’ talk.”95
After he was ordered to bring a large metal part to another MexicanAmerican worker, Saucedo uttered two words in Spanish. Holliday
overheard the conversation and told Saucedo that he had just resigned,
ordered him to put on his street clothes, and drove him into town.96 The
court held that the rule prohibiting Spanish clearly had an adverse impact on
Mexican-American employees and that Brothers failed to prove that there
was a credible, bona fide, necessity for the rule.97
In contrast, in another Texas case, Garcia v. Gloor, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a Mexican-American employee
who was fired for speaking Spanish in the workplace in violation of his

93
94
95
96
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Saucedo v. Bros. Well. Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
Id. at 921.
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employer’s English-only rule.98 Although Hector Garcia was born in Texas,
he was bilingual and Spanish was his first language.99 Garcia was employed
as a salesman by Gloor Lumber and Supply Company (“Gloor”) in
Brownsville, Texas. Despite the fact that seven of the eight salesmen were
Hispanic and bilingual, and 75 percent of the population in the area of the
business was Hispanic,100 Gloor felt that the rule was justified for business
reasons. Gloor had a rule prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish on
the job unless they were speaking to a Spanish-speaking client.101 Despite
having a good work record, Garcia was fired after another employee asked
him about an item requested by a client and he responded in Spanish. He
was overheard by Alton Gloor, an officer and stockholder in the company,
and let go.
The narrow issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit was “whether the
English-only rule as applied to Mr. Garcia imposed a discriminatory
condition of employment.”102 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling by the
lower court denying a class action suit because the class was too small to
meet the requirement and also concluding that the rule did not discriminate
on the basis of national origin.103
In seeking to interpret the statute, the court did so through a monolingual
lens. It focused on Garcia’s bilingual ability and concluded that, although he
was able to speak English, “[h]e chose deliberately to speak Spanish instead
of English while actually at work,” and he “was permitted to speak the
language he preferred during work breaks.”104
In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., KIIS-FM (KISS) in Los Angeles
similarly fired Valentine Jurado after he was instructed to broadcast only in
98

Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
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English and allegedly refusing to abide by the request. Jurado was a radio
announcer of Mexican and Native American descent and a bilingual
English/Spanish speaker.105 He began working as a disc jockey under the
name of “Val Valentine” and broadcast in English until, at the request of the
program director, he began using a few phrases of “street Spanish” in an
effort to attract more Spanish-speaking listeners. 106 After a consultant
concluded that the bilingual format actually hurt the radio station’s ratings
he was directed by the new program director to stop using Spanish on the
air.107 The parties disagreed as to what happened next, with Jurado claiming
he was fired and the station saying he quit.108 However, for the purposes of
Summary Judgment, KIIS admitted Jurado was fired.109
Jurado’s race and national origin discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C
§1981110 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and his claims for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act were denied by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The court affirmed a lower court Summary Judgment Motion on
behalf of defendants.111 The court held that the plaintiff had failed to make a
prima facie disparate treatment case, given that the English-only rule was
motivated by market conditions rather than racial considerations, and
because he failed to show that he participated in any activity under Title VII
that protected against retaliation by an employer. 112 Finally, the court
rejected Jurado’s only disparate treatment claim that the English-only rule
somehow disadvantaged Hispanics because “[Jurado] was fully bilingual
and could easily conform to the order.”113 The court, citing Garcia v. Gloor,
105
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concluded that “[a]n employer can properly enforce a limited, reasonable,
and business-related English-only rule against an employee who can readily
comply with the rule and who voluntarily chooses not to observe it . . . .”114
However, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court had not abused its discretion in entering a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of an English-only rule imposed by the
Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District of Los Angeles.115 Alva
Gutierrez was one of several bilingual Latinas employed by the court as
deputy clerks who were expected to translate for the non-English-speaking
public.116 However, the court enacted a new personnel rule that prohibited
employees from using a language other than English outside of their
capacity as interpreters for the public. 117 The rule was subsequently
amended to exclude conversations held during employee breaks or lunch.118
Gutierrez and the other bilingual clerks were upset with the English-only
rule and Gutierrez filed a complaint with the United States Equal
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She then brought suit against the judges
of the EEOC adjucication seeking money damages, injunctive relief, and
attorney fees.119 Gutierrez argued that the English-only rule (1) resulted in
racial and national origin discrimination and was a violation of Title VII,120
(2) denied her the right to enter into contracts with White persons in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and (3) denied her the equal protection of the
law and infringed her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.121 Finally,
Gutierrez sought damages under 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1985(3).122
114
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In addition to holding that Gutierrez was entitled to a preliminary
injunction, the court held that the municipal judges were not entitled to
absolute legislative immunity, that the district court had jurisdiction, and
that qualified immunity was not a defense to a charge of intentional
discrimination. 123 A Ninth Circuit panel voted to deny a petition for
rehearing.124 The dissenters objected and maintained that Gutierrez “cried
out for an en banc consideration” because the panel opinion created a direct
conflict with the Fifth Circuit opinion in Garcia v. Gloor and the Ninth
Circuit holding in Jurado.125
The dissent in Gutierrez would ultimately prevail in Garcia v. Spun Steak
Co., 126 an opinion written by Ninth Circuit Court Judge Diarmuid
O’Scannlain, one of the dissenting judges in Gutierrez.127 Spun Steak Co., a
small South San Francisco producer of frozen poultry and meat products
offered for wholesale distribution,128 had 24 out of a total of 33 workers
who were Spanish speakers. Two of the workers spoke no English and the
rest had “varying degrees of proficiency in English.”129
The plaintiffs, Priscilla Garcia and Maricela Buitrago, were reprimanded
for speaking Spanish while working on the production line in violation of a
recently enacted English-only rule, which prohibited workers from speaking
Spanish except on their lunch or work breaks.130 The English-only rule was
implemented after the company received complaints that some workers

123
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were allegedly using their “bilingual abilities” to harass and insult other
workers.131
The district court held that the English-only policy had an adverse impact
on Hispanic employees unjustified by a sufficient business necessity and
was therefore a violation of Title VII.132 Spun Steak Co. appealed and the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. 133 The Ninth Circuit held that the
employees who spoke both English and Spanish had failed to show that the
English-only requirement had a significant adverse impact on the terms,
conditions, or privileges of their employment.134 Incredibly, the court added
that plaintiffs had failed to show that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether those employees who did not speak English were
adversely impacted by the ruling.135
C. Educational Segregation and Discrimination
The race/plus model is also relevant for education and for attempts to
desegregate schools following the landmark decision in Brown.136 Although
Brown overturned the prevailing “separate but equal” doctrine established
in Plessy v. Ferguson137 and outlawed racial discrimination and segregation,
holding that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal and in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, de jure segregation of Mexican students
continued both before and after Brown. Such segregation was generally
upheld on the grounds that it was based not on race per se, but on the fact
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that Mexican students had special language and other educational needs,138
so that, once again, language became a proxy for race.
Although the legal segregation of Mexican students would be overturned
in Westminster School Dist. et al. v. Mendez,139 Mexican parents had fought
against the segregation of Mexican children for decades prior to this historic
decision, which laid the groundwork for Brown. These efforts were initiated
in Texas and California in the 1930s.140 One of the desegregation efforts
occurred in 1930 when Mexican parents challenged the segregation of
Mexican children in Del Rio, Texas. 141 The resulting case, Independent
School Dist. v. Salvatierra, was therefore significant in challenging the
racial binary in seeking to determine the constitutionality of the common
practice of racially segregating Mexican children. The case was important
for a number of reasons. First, it was significant because the Texas State
Constitution of 1875, ratified in 1876, permitted the segregation of
“colored” and “White” children.142 Second, it provided legal precedent for
subsequent challenges to the segregation of Mexican children. 143 Finally,
the plaintiffs in the case were represented by attorneys representing The
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), a newly formed civil
rights organization that advocated for the rights of Mexican citizens.144
The district court in Salvatierra held that the school district could not
legally segregate Mexican children because they were deemed to be
“members of the White race.” 145 Although the trial court granted an
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injunction preventing the district from segregating Mexican children, the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals overturned the lower court, holding that the
district did not intentionally and arbitrarily segregate Mexican children by
race given that the children had special language needs and that the school
district had the authority to segregate children on educational grounds.146
Although largely unknown, Alvarez v. Lemon Grove was the first
successful desegregation case in the United States147 and took place some
25 years before Brown v. Board of Education. On January 5, 1931,
Principal Jerome Green, acting under instructions from Lemon Grove
School trustees, literally turned away Mexican school children at the school
house door and directed them to a new school. This school came to be
known within the local Mexican community as la caballeriza (the stable).148
The parents refused to send their children to the new school and, since
they were not admitted to the main schoolhouse, a boycott and lawsuit
ensued. Mexican parents came together to form El Comite de Vecinos de
Lemon Grove (The Lemon Grove Neighborhood Committee) and organized
a successful boycott of the school, ordering their children not to attend the
new school. Eventually, with the support of the Mexican Consul the parents
brought a successful suit in the San Diego Superior Court.
Judge Claude Chambers of the San Diego Superior Court ruled that
separate facilities impeded the language development of Spanish-speaking
students. Additionally, he held that the school board did not have the right
to segregate Mexican children because they were Caucasian and California
law had no provision for their segregation, although state statutes allowed
for the segregation of African American and Indian children. 149 Judge
Chambers ruled against the Lemon Grove School District and ordered them
146
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to reinstate the children in the regular school.150 Although Lemon Grove
was an important ruling for Mexican Americans, it failed to challenge the
racial binary and de jure racial segregation.151 In fact, it “had no precedentsetting ruling affecting either the State of California or other situations of
school segregation in the Southwest.”152
In the landmark case of Westminster School Dist. of Orange County et al.
v. Mendez et. al.,153 some seven years before Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned the segregation of Mexican children, ruling that such
segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that
Mexicans were “Caucasian” and the California statute at issue did not
specifically permit the segregation of Mexican students. In Mendez, the
parents in the Westminster School District brought suit alleging that a
common plan had been adopted and put into effect by the School District
and common rules and regulations had been adopted and implemented. The
parents alleged that, as a result, “‘petitioners and all others of Mexican and
Latin descent’” [we]re ‘barred, precluded and denied’ [from] ‘attending and
using and receiving the benefits and education furnished to other children,’
and [we]re segregated in schools ‘attended solely by children of [M]exican
and Latin descent.’”154 Petitioners further argued that they “and others in the
same situation have objected, and they have demanded and have been
refused admission to schools within their respective districts which they
would attend but for the practice of segregation.”155
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court ruling and
found that
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the acts of respondents were and are entirely without authority of
California law, notwithstanding their performance has been and is
under color or pretense of California law. Therefore, conceding for
the argument that California could legally enact a law authorizing
the segregation as practiced, the fact stands out unchallengeable
that California has not done so but to the contrary has enacted laws
wholly inconsistent with such practice. By enforcing the
segregation of school children of Mexican descent against their
will and contrary to the laws of California, respondents have
violated the federal law as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution by depriving them of liberty and
property without due process of law and by denying to them the
equal protection of the laws.156
Although not directly addressing segregation, in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court upheld the
Texas system for financing public education based on local property taxes
as constitutionally permitted and not a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause because education, while important, was not a fundamental right.157
It also held that even though over 90 percent of the school district at issue
was made up of minorities and was about 86 percent Mexican, the
distinction between levels of school funding was based on economic status
and not directly on race.158
D. Alienage: “The Mexican Exception” to the Fourth Amendment
In an immigration context, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, that “Mexican appearance” or being “Mexican-looking” is
one of a number of legitimate factors that can be used by law enforcement
in stopping people, without intruding on the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.159 The issue before
156
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the Supreme Court was whether a roving patrol may legally stop a vehicle
and question its occupants when the only basis for the stop is that the
occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry.160
The decision in Brignoni-Ponce had the effect of limiting the authority of
Border Patrol agents to question people in the vicinity of the border. 161
Except at the border or its functional equivalent, officers on a roving patrol
may stop vehicles “only if they are aware of specific articulable facts,
together with rational inferences from those facts that reasonably warrant
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the
country.” 162 A number of factors may be taken into account in deciding
whether there is reasonable suspicion, such as information about recent
illegal border crossings in the area, the driver’s behavior, driving patterns,
and obvious attempts to avoid detection.163 The Court concluded, however,
that “the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is
high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing
alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are
aliens.”164 While the Court held that a stop could not be justified solely on
the basis of Mexican appearance, it made “Mexican appearance” one of a
number of factors that can constitutionally be used to establish reasonable
suspicion for stopping a vehicle in a roving patrol.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte et al., the Supreme Court
distinguished between roving patrols and fixed checkpoints.165 The Court
held that the Border Patrol’s routine stopping of a vehicle at a permanent
checkpoint located on a major highway away from the Mexican border for
brief questioning of the vehicle’s occupants is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. Additionally, the Court held that immigration stops and
questioning may be made at reasonably located checkpoints in the absence
160
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of any individualized suspicion that the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens, although such a stop is technically a de minimis intrusion of the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.166
In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the decision virtually empties
the Fourth Amendment of its reasonableness requirement,167 adding that
[e]very American citizen of Mexican ancestry, and every Mexican
alien lawfully in this country, must know after today's decision that
he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being
subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation,
both prolonged and to an extent far more than for non-Mexican
appearing motorists.168
Thus, both Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuertes had the effect of making
“Mexican appearance” a constitutionally permissible basis for making an
immigration stop to question the occupants of a vehicle both at fixed
checkpoints and on roving patrols.

VII. CONCLUSION
In applying the race/plus model to Jalos migrants, it is clear that despite
the fact that they tend to be more fair-skinned than many Mexican migrants,
Jalos migrants and Mexicanos and Latinas/os are still subjected to
discrimination that is based not only on race or skin color, but also on other
factors, such as language, real or perceived immigration status, or simply
because they are deemed to be “Mexican looking” or “illegal.” Many people
in the study commented on how they were disadvantaged because they were
not fluent in English or because they entered the United States “cruzando el
cerro” (without papers). Despite being extremely religious and tied to the
Catholic Church, others shared that they had experienced discrimination
against Spanish speakers in their local parish.
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Because of the impact of CRT and cultural studies, the narratives of
previously excluded groups are now being slowly incorporated into law and
social science.169 Any paradigm that seeks to understand the experience of
Mexicans and Latinas/os in the United States must not only incorporate
insider narratives, but also reject monolithic conceptions of Chicana/Latina
culture and identity that fail to take into account nationality, gender, sexual
orientation, and the regional and generational diversity of the Mexicans and
other Latinas/os in the United States.
There has been a challenge to the traditional immigrant model, which
treated people as either immigrants or natives, and a growing awareness of a
multinational border culture with an emergent transnational experience and
identity, or what some have identified as a unique third space between the
sending and receiving nation states. A related need is full recognition of the
diversity of the Latina/o population in terms of race, place of birth,
citizenship, and immigration status. This increased interest in immigration
and immigrant rights issues has been coupled with a growing realization
that the fate of Chicanas/os and Latinas/os who are native-born or
naturalized citizens is inextricably linked to the treatment of immigrants.170
The quest for civil rights has been expanded to include not only
citizenship rights, but also cultural and linguistic rights, or what has been
termed “cultural citizenship.”171 However, there is an interesting disjuncture
between “cultural rights” and “citizenship rights.” As Renato Rosaldo has
169
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observed, cultural rights and citizenship rights tend to be inversely related
so that as one increases, the other decreases. In this sense, “[f]ull citizens
lack culture, and those most culturally endowed lack full citizenship.”172
Finally, I submit that any adequate conception of race and racism must
reject the prevailing Black/White binary model in law and the social
sciences, and recognize not only the racial diversity of Chicanas/os and
Latinas/os, but also that we are subjected to discrimination that is based not
only on race, but on language, culture, and real or perceived alienage status.
We must also call into question idealist and color-blind conceptions of race,
which treat race either as an epiphenomenon, lacking any causal influence,
or contend that we somehow promote racism by incorporating the analytical
concept of race into our discourse. While we should move toward a
structural view of race and racism, must simultaneously resist the
temptation to adopt a concept of race that focuses exclusively on social
structure and denies any sense of agency or control to the individual.
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